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Abstract
Tournaments have been objected as resulting from ad hoc restrictions
to the contracting problem which are not easily justified. Taking into
account that a performance measure might not be verifiable to a third
party, however, a restriction to payments which sum up to a constant may
be reasonable. The paper analyzes such fixed payment schemes with regard
to their optimality and the relation to the special case of tournaments. It
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1 Introduction
Tournaments and contests are common instruments for compensation and incen-
tive purposes. For example, they are frequently applied in sales force compen-
sation systems when a salesmen of the year is nominated and rewarded.1 They
are also observed in broiler production (Knoeber and Thurman 1994) or in situa-
tions where organizational members compete for a promotion within a hierarchy
(Bognanno 2001).
In all of these examples, an agent’s compensation mainly or exclusively de-
pends on his rank within a group of competitors, but not (or only to a minor
extent) on his absolute level of performance. From an information economics per-
spective, this provokes the question of why not all available information is used
for compensation purposes. In this respect, Mookherjee (1984) applies Holm-
stro¨m’s (1979) informativeness result of the standard agency model to show that
a tournament contract will be optimal if an agent’s rank in output is statisti-
cally sufficient for all available information. In a more specific setting, Green and
Stokey (1983) show that individual contracts dominate tournaments whenever
the agents’ outputs admit only idiosyncratic risk.
These results have been derived in an optimal contracting framework, where
no further restriction are imposed to the compensation schemes. Tournament
contracts, however, have the desirable property that the total sum of payments is
constant. This feature has been used to propose tournaments as a general device
to overcome the so called unverifiability problem (Malcomson 1984): they can be
used for compensation purposes even if the signals applied are not verifiable to
a third party. Since the total payment is constant, the principal, contrary to an
individual incentive contract, cannot benefit from misreporting these measures.
1For details on sales contests, see Kalra and Shi (2001).
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But tournaments are not the only compensation form to fulfil the desired
property of a constant total for wage payment. As empirical evidence, it can
be noted that Japanese firms make extensive use of a special type of relative
performance payment in which a constant bonus is distributed to workers of a
group proportionate to their contribution to the total output (Kra¨kel 2003).
The present paper analyzes the role of tournaments within the class of pay-
ment schemes which fulfil the proposed property. To that purpose, I distinguish
situations in which an outside party is used to hold the total payment constant
from payment schemes which distribute the hole amount to a group of agents,
irrespective of what outcome is observed. It emerges that under both regimes,
a winner-takes-all tournament is optimal if the agents are risk-neutral, identical
and of limited wealth. Under more general conditions of risk-averse agents, it is
shown that a third party is not needed if the agents are of unlimited wealth, but
that it should be engaged as soon as liability constraints become binding and the
agents earn rents from this restriction.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
basic model, in which section 3 analyzes the use of fixed payment schemes and
bonus pools. Section 4 is devoted to the role of tournaments within these classes
of payment schemes. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 Basic model
I study a moral hazard problem with multiple agents and subjective information
about the agents’ productive contributions. To be concrete, consider a principal
who hires a group of agents i = 1, . . . , n to perform one-time certain actions ai ∈
[ai, ai] ⊂ R on his behalf. The agents are assumed to be effort-averse and weakly
risk-averse, with additively separable preferences Vi(si, ai) = Ui(si) − di(ai), in
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which si is the monetary transfer received from the principal, and U
′
i > 0, U
′′
i ≤
0, d′i > 0, d
′′
i > 0.
I focus on the principal’s problem of inducing a certain profile a0 = (a01, . . . , a
0
n)
of actions at minimal cost.2 To that purpose, the principal receives a signal
yi ∈ {yi1, . . . , yimi} for the action of each agent i. Without loss of generality,
let the support of yi be indexed such that yil < yi,l+1 ∀i, l = 1, . . .m
i − 1. The
signals follow conditional probability functions pi(yi | ai) which are assumed to be
continuously differentiable in ai, with positive probability for all realizations of yi,
regardless of the agent’s action (non-moving support). Moreover, the signals are
stochastically independent. Thus, from the analysis of Green and Stockey (1983),
an individual contract for each agent would dominate a relative payment scheme
if no further restrictions were made to the contract. Here, however, I assume
that while the probabilities are common knowledge among the principal and all
agents, the realization of y = (y1, . . . , yn) is only observed by the principal. In
particular, it cannot be verified to another party and thus is not available for an
explicit contract.3
Using the signals yi, the principal designs a contract s(y) = (s1(y), . . . , sn(y))
in order to induce the desired action a0. Since y is privately observed by the
principal, these payments have to be self-enforcing. The next section analyzes
conditions under which this is the case. Furthermore, the agents must be willing
to sign the contract. To that purpose, their expected utilities under s and a0 have
to exceed their respective reservation level, which are denoted by V Ri . Finally,
the agents may be wealth-constricted, in which case their compensation may not
2Referring to the decomposition approach introduced by Grossman an Hart (1983), this is
the cost minimization part of the principal’s optimization problem.
3If the agents also acquired some information on their performance, they might engage
in a signaling game as analyzed by McLeod (2003). By assuming that only the principal
privately observes yi, I preclude this opportunity and focus on the use of the signals for entirely
discretionary bonus payments.
4
fall short of a certain minimum level smini .
Two assumptions are adapted from the standard principal-agent model of
moral hazard, in order to ensure that the first-order approach is valid to describe
the agents’ action choices under the contract s(y):
Assumption 1 (MLRP) The signals yi fulfil the monotone likelihood ratio prop-
erty: p′i(yi | ai)/pi(yi | ai) is increasing in yi.
Assumption 2 (CDFC) The signals yi fulfil the convexity of the distribution
function condition:4 ∂2Fi(yi | ai)/∂a
2
i ≥ 0.
The logic behind these conditions is analogous to the standard agency model:
due to the monotone likelihood ratio property, the optimal compensation of one
agent will be nondecreasing in his signal. By the convexity of the distribution
function, the agent’s expected utility is therefore a concave function of his own
effort.5
3 Fixed payment schemes and bonus pools
If the signals were contractible, the optimal contract would specify payment
schemes si(yi) which only depend on the agent’s individual performance.
6 With-
out contractible information, however, the principal has to seek for alternative
mechanisms which allow to use the subjective information yi. In a single-agent
framework, one such mechanism is a fixed payment scheme like it is applied in
4Fi denotes the cumulative distribution function of yi.
5Considered separately, the MLRP in the present model is not restrictive at all. Since yi is
just a performance measure, MLRP can be seen as the convention that the realizations of yi
are ordered by their likelihood ratios. The CDFC, in contrast, has frequently been objected
in the literature as being very restrictive (see Jewitt (1988)). Recently, LiCalzi and Spaeter
(2003) provided two rich distribution families which display both MLR and CDF.
6Due to the signals’ independence, any relative performance evaluation would only add noise
to the agent’s compensation. See Mookherjee (1984).
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McLeod (2003). In such a scheme, the principal divides a fixed amount of money
between the agent and a third party, such as a charity. Rajan and Reichelstein
(2005) extend this scheme to the multi-agent problem by assuming that a fixed
amount is shared by all agents and an outside recipient. Defining si(y) as agent
i’s compensation when the signals y = (y1, . . . , yn) are observed, a fixed payment
scheme in the present model can be defined as follows:
Definition A payment scheme (s1(y), . . . , sn(y)) is called a fixed payment
scheme if
∑n
i=1 si(y) ≤ w for all y and the residual amount w −
∑n
i=1 si(y) is
transferred to an outside party. 2
Two remarks are in order here. First, there is no restriction that si has to
be nonnegative. Negative si, however, require payments to the principal, which
would not be incentive compatible after the signals have been observed. The
contract therefore has to be organized as follows: Each agent has to make an
up-front payment of si = −miny si(y) (or receives a base salary of miny si(y) if
it is nonnegative) when the contract is settled, and the total bonus pool to be
paid by the principal is w +
∑n
i=1 si. For notational convenience, I neglect this
aspect as long as it is of no consequence to the results, and stick to the fiction
that negative payments can be stipulated.
The second remark refers to the structure of the payment scheme. Note
that fixed payment schemes according to the definition also include those con-
tracts composed of n separate schemes si(yi) with si(yi) ≤ wi, where the balance
∑n
i=1(wi − si(yi)) is transferred to an outsider. An obvious question is whether
the principal can improve such schemes by relative performance evaluation, us-
ing (part of) wi − si for compensating the other agents instead of “burning” the
money. As an extreme, Rajan and Reichelstein (2006) consider discretionary
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bonus pools in which the whole amount is used internally for contracting:
Definition A payment scheme (s1(y), . . . , sn(y)) is called a bonus pool scheme
if
∑n
i=1 si(y) = w for all y. 2
A bonus pool scheme divides a fixed amount w among the agents, without any
residual transferred to a third party. Any variation in one agent’s compensation
inevitably affects the compensation of at least one other agent. Thus, bonus
pools in any case represent a nontrivial form of relative performance evaluation,
entailing the negative effect that additional risk it put on an agent by making
his compensation depend on signals which are noisy, but contain no information
with respect to his action. Despite this drawback, Rajan and Reichelstein (2006,
proposition 1) prove that for two agents with unlimited liability, the optimal fixed
payment scheme to induce a certain profile a0 of actions is a bonus pool. The
result is easily generalized to the present setting of n agents:
Proposition 1 (Rajan and Reichelstein 2006) If the first-order approach is valid
and agents are of unlimited wealth, the optimal fixed payment scheme is a bonus
pool scheme.
Technically, proposition 1 is due to the fact that all yi are stochastically
independent. Under this assumption, if the principal’s budget constraint were
slack for some yˆ, the optimization with respect to si(yˆ) could be separated from
the optimization with respect to all other sj. This transfers the slackness to all
realizations of y, which of course cannot be optimal.
The economic reasoning behind this – at first glance surprising – result is that
no agent suffers from the additional risk associated with the distribution of the
balance because these payments will always be nonnegative. To see this, consider
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the separate fixed payment schemes si(yi). Since the signals are stochastically
independent, a distribution of the balances wi − si(yi) to the other agents’ pay-
ments can be made without affecting the incentives of the respective agents. To
that purpose, the principal simply raises agent j’s compensation by the same
amount for all possible realizations of yj, provided yi displays the realization for
which the residual wi− si(yi) is sought to be distributed. By this procedure, the
agent j’s expected utility is increased. Thus, in a second step, wj can be reduced,
resulting in a smaller total bonus pool w.
Such a reduction, however, in general can only be done if compensations are
not bounded from below. Limited liability on side of the agents may therefore
obscure the application of discretionary bonus pools. This can be illustrated by
the following example:
Example Let there be n = 2 identical, risk neutral agents with utility
function Vi = si−2a
2
i who can take action ai ∈ [0, 1] and have a reservation utility
of 0.5. The signals yi ∈ {0, 1} are Bernoulli distributed with pi(1 | ai) = ai. The
principal seeks to induce a01 = a
0
2 = 0.5.
First consider separate fixed sum payments for each agents. The optimal
contract in the absence of liability constraints stipulates si(1) = 2 and si(0) = 0.
Thus, the total payment to one agent is wi = 2, and a balance of wi − si(0) = 2
is transferred to a third party in case that yi = 0.
Using a joint fixed sum payment, this balance could be transferred to the
second agent, rendering payments si(yi, yj) as follows: si(0, 0) = si(1, 1) = 2,
si(1, 0) = 4 and si(0, 1) = 0. Incentives are unchanged, but the scheme leaves
each agent with a utility of 1.5. Consequently, all payments can be reduced by
1, which in fact yields an optimal fixed sum contract si(0, 0) = si(1, 1) = 1,
si(1, 0) = 3 and si(0, 1) = −1.
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Now let the agents be wealth-constrained such that si ≥ 0: no payments can
be made to the principal. Obviously, the separate schemes remain valid under
this restriction, whereas the proposed joint payment scheme requires a payments
of the agents. Increasing all payments by the missing amount, however, leaves
the agents with a positive rent, while the principal’s net benefit is identical to
that under the separate contract considered before. In fact, this is one optimal
bonus pool arrangement7 with a total cost of 4.
The question on hand, however, is whether the principal can do better with
a joint fixed payment scheme even though the agents are wealth-constrained. In
fact he can, but this requires payments to the outside party. An optimal fixed
payment scheme determines si(0, 0) = si(0, 1) = 0, si(1, 1) = 4/3 and s(1, 0) =
8/3. The total cost is w = 8/3, which is paid to a third party if (y1, y2) = (0, 0).
2
The example clarifies the inherent problem of bonus pool schemes: Even if all
agents produce the lowest outcome, the bonus w has to be distributed to them. If
the agents earn a rent from limited liability, incentives can therefore be improved
by transferring part of w to an outside party. To see this, consider the agent’s
incentive compatibility constraint under the first-order approach:
∂Vi
∂ai
=
∑
y
Ui(si(y)
∂
∂ai
p(y | a0)− d′(ai) = 0 (1)
Due to the assumption that the signals are stochastically independent, the marginal
7The solution is not unique because the principal may choose how to distribute the rent
among the agents.
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probability in (1) can be written as
∂
∂ai
p(y | a0) = p′i(yi | a
0
i )
∏
j 6=i
pj(yj | a
0
j) =
p′i(yi | a
0
i )
pi(yi | a0i )
n∏
j=1
pj(yj | a
0
j), (2)
which allows to make use of the properties of the likelihood ratio. Due to the
MLRP and the fact that the expected value of the likelihood ratio is zero for a
non-moving support, the likelihood-ratio for the poorest outcome will be negative.
From this, however, it is obvious that incentives can be improved by third-party
contracting whenever a payment si(yi1,y−i) > s
min
i is stipulated or, more gen-
erally, if si(yi,y−i) > s
min
i and p
′
i(yi | a
0
i )/p(yi | a
0
i ) < 0 for some (yi,y−i). The
following proposition makes use of this effect to derive conditions under which a
bonus pool scheme cannot be optimal.
Proposition 2 If in the optimal fixed payment scheme to implement a0 all agents
earn a positive rent from limited liability, this scheme is not a bonus pool.
The simple idea behind the proof of proposition 2 is that if effort levels a0i > ai
are implemented by a bonus pool scheme, the total payment w has to exceed the
sum of minimum payments smini – otherwise only flat wages si = s
min
i were
possible. Therefore, at least one agent (say i) receives an extra bonus even if
the poorest overall outcome y1 = (y11, . . . , yn1), for which all likelihood ratios
are negative, is realized. As the incentive constraint (1) in conjunction with
(2) shows, agent i’s incentives are increased by reducing si(y1), transferring the
balance to an outside recipient. With regard to the implementation of a0, this
can be used to reduce the overall wage payment w.
At first sight, the proposition seems to conflict a further result by Rajan and
Reichelstein (2006, corollary 1), who prove that the first-best solution can be
obtained by a bonus pool arrangement even under limited liability, if the signals
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yi provide perfect information on ai. Contrary to proposition 2, however, the
liability constraint will never be binding in the situation they analyze because
they assume that the agents have a nontrivial outside option in the sense that
URi > Ui(s
min
i )− d(a
0
i ). Therefore, a positive penalty for disobedient behavior is
possible even under limited liability. Since only a minimal penalty is necessary
to enforce a certain action under perfect information, this suffices to induce the
first-best action, which is also without an additional cost because the punishment
will never occur in the equilibrium.
4 Symmetric agents and tournaments
To analyze the role of tournaments among fixed payment schemes, I will now focus
on environments in which agents are symmetric. Thus, assume that all action
spaces, reservation utilities and liability levels are identical and all performance
measures yi have the same support and follow the same probability distributions.
The principal wishes to implement a symmetric Nash equilibrium of actions a0i =
a0 for all i. To that purpose, he offers a symmetric fixed payment scheme to the
agents:
Definition A payment scheme is called symmetric if
si(yil, yjk,y−ij) = sj(yik, yjl,y−ij) (3)
for all i, j ∈ N and all y−ij. 2
Condition (3) is an anonymity property stating that an agent’s payment
should not depend on his identity, but only on his performance. A similar condi-
tion is well-known from the literature on contests, where it serves as part of an
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axiomatic approach to contest success functions (see Skaperdas 1996).
With regard to bonus pool schemes, probably the most prominent symmet-
ric payment scheme is a tournament, where an agent’s compensation is entirely
determined by the rank of his performance within the group of all agents. But
also more general and smoother payment schemes are included, like those ap-
plied in Japanese firms, where payments si = wyi/
∑
j yj are proportionate to
outputs (see Kra¨kel 2003). The latter may also be generalized to payments
si = wf(yi)/
∑
j f(yj) for some increasing function f , like it is known from con-
test success functions. An extreme case of such contest success functions, in
turn, is again a tournament, which is obtained for f(y) = limx→∞ y
x. In this
case, only the best performing agent(s) receive(s) a prize. Since under certain
conditions, such winner-takes-all tournaments are cost-minimizing tournament
schemes,8 they are of particular interest for the following analysis. In the present
model, they can be described as follows:
Definition A symmetric fixed payment scheme is called a winner-takes-all
tournament if
si(yil, sjk,y−ij) = s
min
for all i ∈ N and j ∈ N/{i} such that yil < yjk. 2
This is a very general definition of a tournament. It only requires that an
agent is not rewarded if there is a better performing competitor. Among the best-
performing agent(s), the division of the prize directly follows from the symmetry
assumption: in case of a tie, it is shared equally among the best competitors.
The size of this prize, however, is not specified by the definition. In particular,
8See Budde (2006) or, for specific distributions, Kalra and Shi (2001).
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the principal may transfer money to a third party, thereby reducing the prize
paid to the winner(s) of the tournament. With regard to bonus pool schemes, I
will first abandon this opportunity and assume that the prize is constant for all
realizations of y. Later, I will return to the more general payment scheme.
Definition A tournament is called fixed-prize if its prize is identical for all
signal realizations. 2
Obviously, a fixed-prize winner-takes-all-tournament is a bonus pool scheme.
Within this class, it can be proven as the cost-minimizing payment scheme to
induce a certain action:
Proposition 3 If agents are risk-neutral and identical and earn a rent from
limited liability, the optimal symmetric bonus pool scheme is a fixed-prize winner-
takes-all-tournament.
Like proposition 2, the proof of proposition 3 makes use of the fact that in
the agent incentive compatibility constraint (1), marginal utilities are weighted
by likelihood ratios. Since marginal utilities are constant for risk-neutral agents,
this can be used to show that each scheme that devotes a positive payment to
an inferior agent can be improved by giving the premium to (one of) the most
successful agents instead.
To see this, consider two agents i and j and a symmetric bonus pool scheme
s(yi, yj) for which there exists y
∗ = (yil∗ , yjk∗) such that yil∗ < yjk∗ and si(y
∗) >
smin. Compare this scheme to sˆ(y) which is identical to s except that sˆi(y
∗) =
si(y
∗)−∆ and sˆj(y
∗) = sj(y
∗) +∆ for some ∆ ∈ (0, si(y
∗)− smin]. By the sym-
metry of the scheme, this implies that also the compensation for the permutation
y0 = (yik∗, yjl∗) is changed. For agent i this means that sˆi(y
0) = si(y
0) + ∆.
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Thus, with regard to his incentive compatibility constraint (1), the effect of a
change from s to sˆ is
D ≡
∂EVi
∂ai
(sˆi, a
0
i )−
∂EVi
∂ai
(si, a
0
i )
= ∆
p′i(yik∗ | a
0
i )
pi(yik∗ | a0i )
p(y0 | a0)−∆
p′i(yil∗ | a
0
i )
pi(yil∗ | a0i )
p(y∗ | a0) (4)
For a symmetric equilibrium, p(y∗ | a0) = p(y0 | a0). Thus, under the MLRP
the sign of D is positive because yik∗ > yil∗ , and incentives are higher for sˆ.
The economics behind this result are related to those of a standard agency
model (cf. Demougin and Fluet 1998): under risk neutrality and limited liability
it is most effective to reward only the top performance, the probability of which
reacts most sensitive to the agent’s action if the monotone likelihood ratio prop-
erty is fulfilled. For a symmetric bonus pool scheme, this implies that a bonus
should only be awarded to the best performing agent(s).
This result was most easily shown for bonus pool schemes. As proposition 2
has shown, however, these schemes are not the optimal fixed payment schemes if
agents earn a rent from their limited liability. Thus, without further restrictions
to the payment scheme, namely the exclusion of third-party contracting, only
little insight can be gained from proposition 3.
As an inspection of the above reasoning shows, however, the same arguments
as in the proof of proposition 3 can be applied to schemes in which part of the
bonus w is transferred to an outside recipient. The only requirement to apply
the improvement is that the same amount is paid under y∗ and all its permu-
tations, which is guaranteed for any symmetric payment scheme. Proposition 3
can therefore be generalized to symmetric fixed payment schemes:
Corrollary 1 If agents are risk-neutral and identical and earn a rent from lim-
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ited liability, the optimal symmetric fixed payment scheme is a winner-takes-all
tournament.
The optimal fixed payment scheme devotes a prize only to the best performing
agent(s). This prize, however, may vary with the absolute level of performance.
In the above example, for instance, no prize is paid if both agents fail to deliver
the high outcome of the signal. In all other cases, a total amount of 8/3 is given
to the best performing agent(s). If (y1, y2) = (0, 0), this amount is transferred
to the outside recipient. Consequently, not only the agent’s rank, but also his
absolute performance affects his compensation. By this means, the problem of
tacit collusion which is inherent in fixed-prize tournaments can be mitigated.
5 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed fixed payment schemes under limited liability. As long
as the liability constraints are not binding, the optimal fixed payment scheme
is a bonus pool arrangement. As soon as agents earn a rent from limited lia-
bility, however, it becomes advantageous to restrict the payments to the agents,
transferring the balance to an outside party, such as a charity. If agents are
symmetric and risk-neutral, the optimal fixed payment scheme in both situations
is a winner-takes-all tournament. Without liability constraints, the prize of this
tournament is fixed, whereas under limited liability, the prize may be reduced
for poor overall performance of the agents. This complies with procedures in
corporate practice, where a bonus pool frequently is of variable size (Rajan and
Reichelstein 2006, fn. 2). In most instances, however, the size of the bonus pool
is not left to the principal’s discretion, but is contingent to some verifiable signal,
such as revenues or accounting income. In view of the fact that both fixed and
15
variable bonus pools are observed in practice, it may therefore be an avenue for
future research to analyze under which conditions one of the two alternatives
prevails.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
The proofs replicates the arguments of Rajan and Reichelstein (2006) for n agents.
The principal’s optimization problem is given by
min w (5)
s.t. w ≥
n∑
i=1
si(y) ∀y, (6)
∑
y
Ui(si(y))p(y | a
0)− d(a0i ) ≥ U
R
i i = 1, . . . , n (7)
∑
y
Ui(si(y))pai(y | a
0)− d′(a0i ) = 0 i = 1, . . . , n, (8)
where pai(y | a
0) = ∂p(y | a0)/∂ai denotes the marginal probability of y with
respect to ai. Denoting the multipliers of the restrictions by λ(y), µi and νi,
respectively, the optimal solution has to fulfil the following conditions:
∂L
∂w
= −1 +
∑
y
λ(y) = 0 ∀y (9)
∂L
∂si(y)
= −λ(y) + µiU
′
i(si(y))p(y | a
0)
+ νiU
′
i(si(y))pai(y | a
0) = 0 ∀y, i (10)
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Now consider a fixed payment scheme s which is not a bonus pool: there exist yˆ
such that w >
∑n
i=1 si(yˆ). Consequently, λ(yˆ) = 0 and thus (10) yields
−
µi(yˆ)
νi(yˆ)
=
pai(yˆ | a
0)
p(yˆ | a0)
∀i (11)
Due to the independence of the yis, the term pai(y | a
0)/p(y | a0) = p′i(yi |
a0i )/pi(yi | a
0
i ) only depends on yi. Thus, (11) holds for all (yˆi,y−i). Since (11)
is valid for all i, it therefore holds for all y. But then λ(y) = 0 for all y, which
contradicts (9). Hence, s cannot be optimal. 2
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
The principal’s optimization problem under limited liability is given by (5) – (8),
with the additional constraints
si(y) ≥ s
min
i ∀ i,y. (12)
Let ηi(y) denote the Lagrange multipliers of constraints (12). The first-order
condition with respect to si(y) becomes
∂L
∂si(y)
= −λ(y) + µiU
′
i(si(y))p(y | a
0)
+ νiU
′
i(si(y))pai(y | a
0) + ηi(y) = 0 ∀y, i. (13)
Now consider the situation that all agents earn rents from limited liability in the
optimal fixed payment scheme. I show that this scheme cannot be a bonus pool.
To that purpose, note that µi = 0∀ i when all agents earn rents. Moreover, if s(y)
is a bonus pool, for each y at least one agent’s compensation has to exceed his
liability level because otherwise, only flat wages si(y) = s
min
i ∀y, i are possible.
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Let i be the agent who receives a wage si(y1) > s
min
i for the poorest overall
outcome y1 = (y11, . . . , yn1). The first-order condition w.r.t. si(y1) becomes
∂L
∂si(y1)
= −λ(y1) + νiU
′
i(si(y))pai(y | a
0) = 0 (14)
because µi = 0 and ηi(y1) = 0. Since due to the assumption of a non-moving
support it holds that
∑mi
l=1 p
′(yil | ai) = 0, MLRP implies that pai(y | a
0) =
p′(yi1 | a
0
i )
∏
j 6=i p(yj1 | a
0
j) < 0. Since λ(y1) > 0 by proposition 1, it follows that
νi < 0. This, in turn, by substitution in (12) implies that ηi(y) > 0 for all y for
which p′(yi | a
0
i ) ≥, i.e. only the minimum wage s
min
i is paid for high outcomes of
yi. Then, however, the incentive compatibility constraint (8) cannot be fulfilled
because
∑mi
l=1 p
′(yil | ai) = 0 and si(y1) > s
min
i . 2
A.3 Proof of proposition 3
The proof is by contradiction. So consider a payment scheme si(y) for which
there exist an output y∗ such that y∗il ≡ yil∗ < y
∗
jk ≡ yjk∗ and
si(y
∗) ≡ si(yil∗ , sjk∗ ,y
∗
−ij) > s
min. (15)
for some i, j, l∗, k∗. If agents earn a rent from limited liability, the first-order
conditions with respect to si and sj are given by
∂L
∂si(y∗)
= −λ(y∗) + νi
∂
∂ai
p(y | a0) + ηi(y
∗) = 0 (16)
and
∂L
∂sj(y∗)
= −λ(y∗) + νi
∂
∂aj
p(y | a0) + ηj(y
∗) = 0. (17)
18
For identical agents, a symmetric payment scheme and a symmetric equilibrium
a0, it holds that νi = νj. Furthermore, ηi = 0 if si(y
∗) > smin. Since
∂
∂ai
p(y | a0) =
p′i(yil∗ | a
0
i )
pi(yil∗ | a0i )
p(y∗ | a0) <
∂
∂aj
p(y | a0) =
p′j(yj | a
0
j)
pj(yj | a0i )
p(y∗ | a0)
by MLRP and the fact that yil∗ < yjk∗ , it follows that νi < 0. This, however,
cannot be true for a0 > a (see proof of proposition 2). 2
A.4 Proof of corollary 1
The corollary can be proven analogously to proposition 3. The only difference is
that λ(y∗) may be zero, which does not change the line of arguments. 2
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